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The purpose of this contribution is to explain the state of the current UK economic situation, 
without forgetting the prospects as highlighted by the published forecasts for the period to 
2019 as explained below. It is claimed by government supporters that the current UK 
economic growth has emerged as a result of the austerity programme that the coalition 
government of the Conservative and Liberal Democrats parties in the UK has pursued since 
the general election of May 2010. The coalition government appears intent at continuing their 
austerity measures for the next five years to 2019, at least, and the Labour Party has joined in 
the clamour for continuing austerity. The incoming coalition government in May 2010 placed 
deficit reduction as central and played much more on doomsday scenarios of the reactions of 
credit ratings agencies and financial markets if actual and planned deficit reduction measures 
were not introduced.  
 
The current UK economic growth has nothing to do with austerity causing it. It is largely due 
to the response of households to austerity in their attempt to maintain their level of 
consumption through borrowing, thereby increasing substantially private sector debt. What is 
also worrying is the failure of real wages to grow. Average wages grew by 1.25 per cent in 
2013, below the consumer price inflation, clearly implying that they fell in real terms. Since 
then the annual rate of wage growth has fallen sharply. Households at the top of the 
distribution have been earning an increasing share of national income, while the rest have had 
to borrow more in order to be able to maintain their consumption needs. Both factors have 




We proceed by looking at some well-known identities in section 2 to help us make the point, 
before we turn our attention to the current UK economic situation in section 3. We summarise 
and conclude in section 4.  
 
2. Macroeconomic Identities 
 
In what follows in this section we provide standard macroeconomic identities, which can be 
very useful for the analysis that follows. Two terms can be portrayed. One, where the 
identities can be viewed from their ex post aspect, in which case they can be described as 
simply income identities. Another, where the identities are in terms of their ex ante aspect, in 
                                              
1
 It is interesting to note that household debt has not been dealt with in the same way as in the case of the 




which case they can be viewed as equilibrium conditions. Equation (1) below when 
approached from the latter point of view it would be equality between intended leakages and 
intended injections into the circular flow of income, and thereby suggesting an equilibrium 
situation. 
 
So, in terms of the macro economy we have that total expenditure (E) is: 
 
E = C + I + G + X – Q + NI 
 
where C is private consumption, I is private investment, G is government expenditure, X is 
exports of goods and services, Q is imports of goods and services, and NI is net income from 
abroad.  
 
We also have that national income (Y) is: 
 
Y = C + S + T 
 
where C is as above, S is private savings, and T is tax revenues (net of transfers). 
 
When E = Y, we have: 
 








(1) 𝑆 +  𝑇 +  𝑄 =  𝐼 +  𝐺 +  𝑋 +  𝑁𝐼 
 
 
(1) can be re-written as:  
 
(2) 𝐺 –  𝑇 =  𝑆 –  𝐼 +  𝐹𝐴 
 
where FA is financial account flows and it is equal to current account deficit (= Q – X – NI).  
 
A first implication, which emerges from equation (2), is that the discussion of budget deficits 
cannot proceed without consideration of private sector surpluses. With regard to issues of 
sustainability, a budget deficit is sustainable only if the private sector surplus is sustainable. 




consider the borrowing and lending within the private sector. For example, if there is a set of 
households who persistently run deficits, even though other sets of households persistently 
run surpluses, the position for the first set of households may be unsustainable. A relatively 
small budget deficit (and more so budget surplus) may be unsustainable because the deficits 
of components of the private sector may be unsustainable. An example of this could be the 
position in the UK circa 2007 when household savings were close to zero, and high consumer 
spending was underpinned by rising house prices; it is actually rather difficult to think that 
household savings close to zero and rising house prices (at 10 per cent plus) were sustainable. 
This is to suggest that the budget deficit position was not sustainable at the prevailing level, 
although it was too low, since the private sector position was itself not sustainable. 
 
A second implication is that there can only be net private savings if there is a budget deficit 
or, in a similar manner, the point can be made by reference to the current account/financial 
account position. Thus when there is a tendency for propensity to save to exceed propensity 
to invest, a budget deficit becomes necessary to absorb the difference between intended 
savings and investment if savings and investment decisions are to be implemented. 
  
 
3. Current UK Economic Situation 
 
The UK Treasury claimed back in 2011 that austerity was “consistent with OECD and IMF 
research, which suggests that fiscal consolidation efforts that largely rely on spending 
restraint promote growth. Tax measures can be an effective tool for reducing the deficit 
quickly, allowing for phased reductions in public spending. The Government’s consolidation 
plans therefore involve a rising contribution from public spending over the forecast period” 
(HM Treasury 2011, p. 15).
2
 It is then a matter of arithmetic that a reduction in the budget 
deficit has to be accompanied by some combination of reduction in private savings, rise in 
private investment and reduction in current account deficit (see equation 2). There are in 
effect two routes to a reduced budget deficit: cuts in public expenditure and raises in taxes, 
both of which depress economic activity such that the right-hand side of the above equation 
falls (e.g. savings fall, current account deficit declines); or there is a pick-up in investment 
and exports, which enables the deficit to fall alongside an expansion in economic activity. 
The view underlying government policy appears to have been that an expansion of 
investment and exports would come as a result of deficit reductions. Table 1 shows what has 
happened since 2010 and we discuss this experience in what follows in the rest of this 
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 It should be noted, though, that the IMF has actually changed its mind since the relevant publication referred to 
in the text. In the October 2014 Economic Outlook publication (IMF, 2014) it is argued that substantially 
increased public infrastructure investment can significantly boost growth. Indeed it is suggested that the 
stimulative effect is stronger when investment is financed through borrowing rather than reducing other 





section. We also account for the projections of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)
3
 
and other relevant publications such as OECD and IMF ones, as stated in Table 1. 
 
The UK economy has been expanding recently since 2013 (see Table 1 for the relevant 
figures referred to in this contribution). The government budget deficit has been decreasing, 
although not as fast as planned in 2010,
4
 inflation has been around the official target of 2 per 
cent and the unemployment rate is expected to fall near below 6 per cent by the end of 2014 
(the latest actual figures for 2014 show that the UK unemployment rate was 6.0 in period 
June to August 2014, from the peak of 8.1 percent in 2011). Unemployment has been falling 
but real wages have also continued to fall. The Office of National Statistics (ONS) reports 
earnings rising by under 1 per cent (to October 2014) well below the rate of inflation. The 
restrictive fiscal-policy stance has exerted a negative influence on aggregate demand and 
growth, which has been offset by rising domestic private demand. The current account deficit 
deteriorated in the past years, though it is forecast to improve from 2014 onwards, which 
repeats the type of forecasts which have frequently been made that the current account deficit 
will improve in the future. Net exports have had a negligible effect on output growth - even a 
negative impact is noted. On the contrary over the period 2012-2013 the current account 
deficit increased by roughly 1.2 percent. It is also the case that sluggish investment has been 
as much part of the story as the current account deficit.
5
 In terms of monetary policy, the 
‘forward guidance’ of the Bank of England, such as it is,6 indicates that the rate of interest 
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 The OBR was established in 2010 to provide independent and authoritative analysis of the UK’s public 
finances. 
4
 The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer promised at the time of his appointment in 2010 to reduce the deficit 
significantly and completely within five years. It is only two-fifths of achieving it in September 2014 (The 
Economist, 2014, p. 31).  
5
 The ONS in its Statistical Bulletin (30 September, 2014) provides revised national accounts data, which 
suggests that UK’s GDP growth rate in the second quarter of 2014 was 2.7 per cent larger than its pre-crisis 
peak (first quarter of 2008), and that it was 0.9 per cent higher between April and July 2014; however it slowed 
to 0.7 per cent in the third quarter of 2014. Also the household savings ratio in the second quarter of 2014 was 
6.7 per cent, slightly above the 5.7 per cent of the first quarter of 2014 with gross fixed capital formation rising 
to 1.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2014, significantly smaller than the nearly 6 percent of the third quarter 
of 2010. Exports contracted to a greater extent than imports in the second quarter of 2014, with the net trade 
balance worsening in relation to the second quarter of 2013, due to the strong currency. Business activity in the 
services sector expanded at a slower pace by September 2014, a sign that the UK economy is losing some of its 
pace. This is due to a slowdown in manufacturing activity and output (which is still 4.4 per cent lower than its 
pre-crisis peak) in view of weak demand in the euro area for UK products (it is also the case that growth in the 
UK service sector slowed to a three-month low in September 2014, the result of slow wage growth with pay 
lagging behind inflation). It should be noted, though, that higher growth has not been accompanied with the 
expected higher tax receipts. Real household disposable income per head has been revised downwards to 2.7 per 
cent below the 2008 peak as opposed to 1.8 per cent of previous estimations. These revisions can be partly 
explained by the move from the 1995 European System of Accounts to the 2010 European System of Accounts 
(which includes additional areas of the economy than previously). It should also be noted that “Estimates for the 
most recent quarters are provisional and are subject to revision in the light of updated source information” (ONS 
Bulletin, 30 September 2014). 
6
 The new governor of the Bank of England a month after he had taken office on the 1
st
 of July 2013, promoted 
the idea of ‘forward guidance’, namely a pledge that no immediate plans were in place to raise interest rates at 
least before unemployment fell below 7 percent. 
 
However, by the end of 2013 it became obvious that 




under the control of the central bank and the ‘Quantitative Easing’ type of policy would 




The OBR is projecting a further decrease in the budget deficit in the next three years and 
stabilising thereafter (see Table 1). At the same time acceleration in the rate of growth is 
projected, which would keep unemployment on a downward trend. The IMF’s position on the 
current UK economy has been reported (Financial Times, 7 June 2014) at its recent visit to 
London to conduct its annual economic inspection. The IMF welcomed the ‘great economic 
performance’ of the UK but suggested that rapidly rising house prices, weak productivity 
growth and trade deficit are the three principal risks to the recovery’s sustainability. The 
Bank of England (see Barrett et al., 2014) reports that UK productivity is 16 percent below its 
pre-crisis trend, and admits that there is still a significant degree of uncertainty in terms of the 
causes of such decline.  
 
Consumer spending growth in 2013 appears to have been financed more by lower saving than 
by higher incomes.
8
 With consumer spending growth forecast to outpace disposable income 
growth over the near term, it is expected that the saving ratio will fall from just under 5 per 
cent in 2013 to just over 4 per cent in 2014, before declining gradually to around 3 per cent 
by the end of the forecast period. With sluggish net export demand, economic growth 
becomes dependent on rising private borrowing with the private sector continuing to spend in 
excess of its income (Papadimitriou et al., 2014, p. 2). We suggest that this is true for the UK 
since 2010 when austerity policies were adopted and introduced. The UK actually suffered 
badly during the financial crisis that emerged in August 2007.
9
 Real GDP fell by 7 percent 
from peak to trough, considerably more than in the US. Unemployment rose by 3 percentage 
points, and two of the biggest UK banks desperately needed a ‘bail out’, which was provided.  
 
It is the case, and as Table 1 shows, exports have had no effect on the recovery since 2010 
and the government deficit is declining. The government deficit as a percentage of GDP is 
actually projected to decrease from 5.9 percent in 2013 to 5.3 percent in 2014, though recent 
deficit data cast some doubt on that figure and then fall further to reach a low 0.2 percent by 
2019. At the same time, GDP growth is projected to increase by 3.2 percent in 2014, by 2.7 
                                                                                                                                            
replaced by a range of indicators to assess the spare capacity in the economy rather than focusing on 
unemployment in terms of deciding to increase the rate of interest. 
 
7
 The Bank of England rate of interest is 0.5 percent and the QE amounts to £375 billion. 
8
 The ONS provides data that shows households saved 4.2% of their income in the first quarter of 2013. This is 
below the 7.4% level of the year before, and it is indeed the lowest in four years. 
9
 Interestingly enough, a recent Bank of England contribution (Bunn and Rostom, 2014) argues that household 
borrowing produced problems in view of its build up of debt prior to the August 2007 financial crisis, which is 
blamed for the depth of the ‘great recession’. A great deal of the drop in consumption between 2007 and 2009 is 
attributed to ‘debt-tightening’ by indebted households.  It also recognises that clamping down on household 
borrowing might limit growth in the upswing. It is suggested that this “was a key reason why the Financial 
Policy Committee (FPC) took policy actions in June 2014 to insure against the risks from a further significant 




percent in 2015, and by 2.6 in 2016 and 2017, and then to 2.5 percent in 2018 and by 2019 to 
2.4 percent.
10
 The unemployment rate is projected to fall to 5.5 percent by 2018 and 5.4 
percent 2019, while the inflation rate is expected to be around the target of the Bank of 
England (this being 2 percent with 1 percentage point ‘tolerance level’ either side of the 
target inflation rate). The current account deficit as a percentage of GDP is not expected to 
change by much either after 2015 as Table 1 shows. 
 
 We may note at this point that, and as Eggertson and Krugman (2012) hypothesise, there is a 
limit on how far increases in household debt can go, and if that limit is revised downwards 
indebted households would reduce their spending sharply and significantly with no effective 
response on the part of non-debtors. It is also important to note that post-2008 consumer 
spending in the UK has been affected by household debt. Bunn and Rustom (2014) make the 
point when they argue that “Further advances on mortgages (additional borrowing secured 
against a house but not used to buy the property) and unsecured lending (such as personal 
loans or credit card debt) are forms of borrowing that are more likely to be used to finance 
consumption than new mortgage lending. Over the past fifteen years consumption has shown 
some correlation with further advances, although the relationship with unsecured lending is 
less clear” (p. 307). Evidence is provided by Bunn and Rustom (op. cit.) that clearly suggests 
that “a key is that UK households with high levels of mortgage debt made larger adjustments 
in spending after 2007” (p. 307); and that “There is evidence that households with high levels 
of debt have provided some support to UK consumption and GDP during periods of 
economic growth, but have also contributed to deeper downturns and more protracted 
recoveries, especially in the wake of the Great Recession” (pp. 313-314). Also, Boyce (2011) 
suggests that “One in four people in Britain are using over 40 per cent of their wages each 
month just to pay off non-mortgage debt, according to new data”. 
Households, when experiencing stagnating incomes to that extent, they expand their debt in 
order to finance their consumption expenditure which amount to around two-thirds of 
demand); and the UK households over the period of examination have been undertaking just 
that. Under such circumstances, the recovery, such as it is, relies on private-sector borrowing. 
Outstanding household debt in the UK was 72.0 percent of GDP over the period 1998 to 2002 
(in 1960 it amounted to less than 15 percent of GDP); between 2003 and 2007 it shot to 94.3 
percent of GDP, and it has been increasing since (Arestis and Karakitsos, 2013). Bunn and 
Rostom (2014) state that “the household debt to income ratio rose from around 100% in 1999 
to a peak of 160% in 2008” (p. 305). The household debt to GDP ratio fell over the period 
2008 to 2013 by over 20 percentage points. The “cuts in spending associated with debt are 
estimated to have reduced aggregate private consumption by around 2% after 2007” (Bunn 
and Rostrom, 2014, p. 304). However, looking forward, according to the OBR’s economic 
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 NIESR (2014) reports that, as of May 2014, UK output was 0.2 per cent higher than its previous peak of over 
six years ago (January 2008). However, GDP per head and real wages are still below the pre-crisis levels. 
Interestingly enough, though, the OBR (2014a) estimations suggest that real incomes will not return to their 




forecast (OBR, 2014b), released alongside the OBR (2014a), the total household liability is 
set to increase by a far greater amount between 2014 and 2019. OBR expects UK households 
to be in £2.251 trillion of debt by 2019, an increase of a staggering 43 percent. This is all 
confirmed by Table 1 (Household Sectoral Balances as percentage of GDP). Household 
sectoral balances as percentage of GDP have been falling since 2010/2011 significantly and 
turning into negative from 2014/2015 onwards, expected to reach -3.9 percent by 2019/2020. 
This is clearly a state of concern; and as the Bank of England (2013) concludes “… high 
levels of debt remain a source of vulnerability. For example, highly indebted borrowers 
would be less able to withstand a fall in their incomes or an increase in their borrowing costs” 
(pp. 16-17). 
    
These figures for the household debt are not surprising since the simple accounting identities 
reported in section 2 clearly indicate that current account deficits should be mirrored by 
domestic deficits, both public and private. The continuous accumulation of these domestic 
deficits becomes an unsustainable process that leads eventually to a crisis. Fiscal austerity 
makes matters worse since the ‘burden’ of borrowing falls on the private sector, which is 
much more vulnerable in terms of the accumulation of liabilities. It was precisely this process 
of high private expenditure through borrowing that led to the ‘great recession’ (see Arestis 
and Karakitsos, 2013); and as Stiglitz (2014) argues, recovery of the economy through 
consumption is worrying for “It means return to unsustainable patterns of the kind marked the 
pre-crisis days” (p. 20). 
 
In order for the projections reported in Table 1 for the years 2014 to 2019 to materialise net 
private sector lending, that is S-I, will have to fall and converge to zero by the end of 2019.
11
 
For otherwise, and as Godley (1999) suggested some time ago in the case of the US economy 
and the World, and it is still very valid for the UK economy, “if spending were to stop rising 
relative to income without there being either a fiscal relaxation or a sharp recovery in net 
exports, the impetus that has driven the expansion so far would evaporate and output would 
not grow fast enough to stop unemployment from rising. If, as seems likely, private 
expenditure at some stage reverts to its normal relationship with income, there will be, given 
present [restrictive] fiscal plans, a severe and unusually protracted recession with a large rise 
in unemployment” (p. 3).  
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 The UK Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the Bank of England initiated on the 26
th
 of June 2014 new 
macroprudential policies aiming at containing housing price increases through its regulation of lending – a move 
designed to bear down on the risks of excessive debt according to the Bank of England (see PRA, 2014, for full 
details). Mortgage lenders will go through a new test of affordability, which would enable them to establish 
whether new borrowers could still afford to repay their mortgages if within five years interest rates were three 
percentage points higher than they were at the time of the loan. Also a cap of 15 percent in terms of the 
proportion of mortgages that can cover more than 4.5 times the borrowers’ income. About only 10 percent of 
existing mortgage loans are at 4.5 percent times income when the new macroprudential measures were 
introduced, which implies that banks could expand lending further. It should be noted that re-mortgaging is 
excluded from this rule. These credit-control measures, however, are not ‘a stringent cap’, and as such their 




4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
UK’s current recovery seems to be strong but fragile and cause for concern. It is thought by 
the austerity proponents as the right model for recovery. We have argued, however, that the 
current recovery has come about in view of the household sector undertaking increasingly 
more debt to satisfy their consumption needs. The new deputy governor of the Bank of 
England at her first Treasury Select Committee hearing (9 July 2014) made the point that a 
spiralling level of household debt at the back of rising house prices is the biggest thread to the 
UK economic recovery. Also, as Stiglitz (2014) argues, recovery of the economy through 
consumption is worrying for “It means return to unsustainable patterns of the kind marked the 
pre-crisis days” (p. 20). A further concern is the balance of payments, which despite the 25 
percent real depreciation of sterling in 2007-08 the current account deteriorated by 2012-13 
significantly, and expected to continue in deficit (see Table 1). But even with the promising 
expected growth rate of 3.2 per cent in 2014 the rest of the path of growth and the subsequent 
expected growth rates, as shown in Table 1, are well below the trajectory followed prior to 
the great recession. The increasing accumulation of household debt certainly helped to 
stimulate growth but cannot continue ad infinitum. It is also the case that real earnings in the 
UK are still falling, and household debt is still well above its long-term average. The falling 
savings rate has certainly helped to finance higher spending but it cannot go on falling 
indefinitely. 
 
Still, UK’s households remain far too indebted; and there is the real danger when interest 
rates start to rise again for it would have serious implications. And as the Bank of England 
(2014) suggests “At higher levels of indebtedness, households are more likely to encounter 
payment difficulties in the face of shocks to income and interest rates. This could pose direct 
risks to the resilience of the UK banking system, and indirect risks via its impact on 
economic stability” (p. 52). Indeed, and as a report by the Resolution Foundation (Blacklock 
and Whittaker, 2014) suggests, given the high household debt in the UK a rise in the rate of 
interest by the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee would have serious effects. As 
the report puts it: “even a relatively benign unwinding of today’s emergency interest rate 
position allied with anticipated growth in household incomes has the potential to roughly 
double the number of households facing some form of repayment problem by 2018” (p. 5).12 
If anything a crisis may be on the horizon.   
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 This is supported by the conclusions of another report, the 16
th
 Geneva Report, “Deleveraging? What 
Deleveraging? The 16th Geneva Report on the World Economy”, commissioned by the International Centre for 
Monetary and Banking Studies (as reported in the Financial Times, 29 September, 2014). It is suggested in the 
report that world debt (in both developed and emerging countries) has risen from 160 per cent of GDP in 2001 






We conclude by suggesting that the UK experience fits closely with the view that budget 
deficits have an endogenous character, and that fiscal consolidation does not in itself 
stimulate investment and exports. It is the case, and as we have demonstrated, that the main 
condition for deficit reduction is the stimulation of private demand in the form of investment 
and exports.  The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborn, in his Autumn  Budget 
Statement on the 3
rd
 of December 2014, “was forced to admit that the underlying state of the 
public finances was in a worse state than expected” and as a result “austerity would have to 
be extended and Britain’s economic hard times would continue longer than thought” 
(Financial Times, 4 December, 2014). The failure of the Coalition government to eliminate 
the budget deficit as it had aimed to do can be ascribed to a short-fall in tax revenue rather 
than a failure to reduce public expenditure; and the short-fall of tax revenue to a failure of 
exports and investment to recover. Piling on more austerity will have a similar failure of the 




TABLE 1: UK Relevant Data: Actual (2010 to 2013) and Forecast (2014 to 2019) 









-10.0 -7.9 -6.3 -5.9 -5.3 -4.1 -2.4 -0.8 -0.2 -0.2 
Unemployment 
Rate 









-2.7 -1.5 -3.7 -3.6 -2.3 -1.9 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 
Household 
Sectoral Balances 
(Percent of GDP) 
2.8 1.1 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -1.1 -1.9 -2.8 -3.4 -3.9 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, Statistical Annex (May, 2014) and IMF Economic 
Outlook (April, 2014). Projections for 2014-2019 are from the IMF Economic Outlook 
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